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Abstract
Earlier research that reports a correlational pattern between climate anomalies and violent conﬂict
routinely refers to drought-induced agricultural shocks and adverse economic spillover effects as a key
causalmechanism linking the two phenomena. Comparing half a century of statistics on climate
variability, food production, and political violence across Sub-SaharanAfrica, this study offers the
most precise and theoretically consistent empirical assessment to date of the purported indirect
relationship. The analysis reveals a robust link betweenweather patterns and food productionwhere
more rainfall generally is associatedwith higher yields. However, the second step in the causalmodel
is not supported; agricultural output and violent conﬂict are onlyweakly and inconsistently
connected, even in the speciﬁc contexts where production shocks are believed to have particularly
devastating social consequences. Although this null result could, in theory, be fully compatible with
recent reports of food price-related riots, it suggests that thewider socioeconomic and political context
ismuchmore important than drought and crop failures in explaining violent conﬂict in contemporary
Africa.
1. Introduction
A large number of recent studies have attempted to
establish an empirical link between climate variability
and armed conﬂict. So far, this body of research has
failed to converge on a consistent and robust climate
effect (Bernauer et al 2012, Adger et al 2014, Buhaug
et al 2014, Gemenne et al 2014, Salehyan 2014). How-
ever, extant research largely tests direct associations and
remains elusive about possible intervening factors and
facilitating conditions that could translate environmen-
tal hardships into collective violence, potentially
obscuring more subtle associations. Perhaps the most
widely accepted indirect pathway that has been pro-
posed in the literature features weather-driven agricul-
tural shocks as an important intermediate step
(Homer-Dixon 1991, Miguel et al 2004, Koubi et al
2012, Wischnath and Buhaug 2014). This article
presents the ﬁrst true cross-country quantitative analy-
sis of the proposed pathway by investigating how
income ﬂuctuations from climate-sensitive agriculture
affect a spectrum of political violence, and to what
extent socio-political factorsmoderate this relationship.
We analyze post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
whose economies and livelihoods are especially vulner-
able to ﬂuctuations in weather patterns and where
underlying drivers of conﬂict and instability thrive.
Althoughwe ﬁnd a powerful effect of climate variability
on food production, a comprehensive set of regression
models reveal weak and inconsistent connections
between agricultural output and violent conﬂict, also in
the speciﬁc contexts where food-related economic
shocks are believed to have devastating impacts. This
null result by no means implies that local climate
variability and agricultural deﬁcit can never be causally
related to societal instability, but it does question the
general applicability of recent claims that contemporary
African conﬂicts occur partly in response to weather-
induced crop failures.
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2. Climate variability and food production
On a global scale, ﬂuctuations in season temperature
and precipitation levels explain a substantial portion
of the variation in major crop yields (Ray et al 2015).
Despite uncertainty in climate change projections and
the effects of carbon fertilization and crop-level
adaptation, sustained warming over the next decades
may lead to a decline in food production, notably in
dry and tropical climates, shifting production to
higher latitudes (Challinor et al 2014, Asseng et al
2015). Southern Africa and the Sahel, which host large
populations dependent on cultivation of climate-
sensitive crops, are generally regarded among themost
vulnerable regions in the world, and popular African
cereals are under particular pressure of future warm-
ing and extreme weather events (Thornton et al 2011,
Knox et al 2012). The trajectory and strength of future
rainfall patterns in the region are less well understood
(Rowell 2012).
Rainfall variability is generally high in Africa, par-
ticularly in the continent’s drylands. Greater varia-
bility affects biophysical resources such as crops
directly and social conditions indirectly (Barnett and
Adger 2007). African crop production systems are pre-
dominantly rain-fed, implying high interannual vola-
tilities in output. Although income loss from low
production in dry years may be offset partly by higher
yields in wet years, increasingly erratic weather pat-
terns and associated increases in droughts, wild ﬁres,
and ﬂoods threaten to cause a breakdown in agro-eco-
logical systems across the continent in the absence of
new investments and successful adaptation (Lobell
et al 2011, Porter et al 2014).
Social effects of climate variability depend on the
adaptive capacity of cultural, economic, and political
systems. In general, less predictable rainfall increases
production risks, deters investments, and exacerbates
challenges related to capacity and employment, and
may further accentuate livelihood insecurity as people
struggle to recover from loss of key assets. Market
price responses may cushion some of the adverse
ﬁnancial impacts of harvest loss for producers, but can
have severe impacts on consumers (Dorward 2012).
3. Food insecurity and political violence
Humanhistory offers abundant accounts of how rising
food prices and reduced food access have served as
fundamental drivers ofwar and revolution (Rudé1964,
Goldstone 1991, Diamond 2005, Tol and Wagner
2010, Zhang et al 2011). But this dynamic may not be
unique to the pre-modern world. Indeed, several
recent studies draw a causal arrow from food price
shocks to urban social unrest in contemporary Africa
(Berazneva and Lee 2013, Smith 2014, Bellemare
2015), and some also link the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’
uprisings to peaks in international food prices
(Johnstone and Mazo 2011, Sternberg 2012, for a
different perspective, see Sneyd et al 2013).
The uncovered empirical association between
food prices and social unrest is important in its own
right, but the causal role of local weather patterns—
and in the longer run, climate change—in these cases
is unclear. Historically, the key drivers of consumer
price ﬂuctuations are fuel, fertilizer, and transporta-
tion costs, hoarding and market speculation, and,
more recently, expansion of biofuel production
(Tadesse et al 2014). Domestic food policies may dam-
pen, delay or accentuate such ﬂuctuations.
While African states are increasingly dependent on
food imports to cover domestic needs (Rakotoarisoa
et al 2011), agriculture remains the largest economic
sector in terms of state revenues as well as labor oppor-
tunities and livelihood provision. African agriculture
is also highly climate sensitive; only around 6% of the
continent’s food production is irrigated (NEPAD
2013). Accordingly, if we seek to understand how cli-
matic variability and change may be indirectly related
to violent conﬂict, investigating the political effects of
domestic food production shocks is more relevant
than studying social responses to food price changes.
A number of proposed causal pathways link cli-
mate-driven food production changes with political
violence. Loss of income from agriculture and pastor-
alism may increase the motivation and lower the
opportunity cost of joining a rebellion (Miguel
et al 2004, Fjelde 2015). Similarly, agricultural deﬁcit
may add ﬁnancial strains to weak regimes through loss
of tax revenues and foreign exchange earnings and
more costly food imports, draining funding away from
other government sectors and rendering challenges to
state governance, including coups d’état, more viable
(Homer-Dixon 1999, Kim 2015). More generally,
agricultural decline may cause livelihood contraction
and famine and amplify existing social inequalities,
leading to deprivation-related communal conﬂicts
and rioting (Barnett and Adger 2007, Raleigh and Kni-
veton 2012, Kelley et al 2015). In the wake of acute
food shortages, maldistribution or embezzlement of
aid may further contribute to violent conﬂict (Benja-
minsen 2008, Hendrix and Brinkman 2013, Nunn and
Qian 2014). Alternatively, distress migration may lead
to host-newcomer tensions or identity conﬂicts
(Reuveny 2007, Raleigh 2010) and accentuate urban
sprawl. Widespread corruption and authoritarian rule
founded on narrow patronage coalitions—common
features among many African regimes—foster public
disloyalty and lack of trust in political institutions and
may provide the breeding ground within which any of
these social outcomes can play out (Le Billon 2003,
Arriola 2009). A simpliﬁed rendering of the proposed
linkages is portrayed inﬁgure 1.
Societies are not related to nature in a mechanistic
manner, however; the proposed network of linkages
may break down for a number of reasons. Warfare is
often inefﬁcient and costly and bargaining may
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provide solutions short of violent conﬂict
(Fearon 1995); societies may possess sufﬁcient capa-
city to cope with an economic shock and, in the longer
run, adapt to changing ecological conditions, scarcity,
and the tensions these may engender (Salehyan 2008);
crises may promote cooperation rather than conﬂict
(Böhmelt et al 2014); hunger and deprivation may
produce ineffective ﬁghters (Adano et al 2012); or the
adversely affected population may lack the skills,
resources and a shared identity required for mobiliza-
tion and collective action (Tilly 2003). Fundamental
socioeconomic and political conditions as well as geo-
graphical and cultural contexts are likely to inﬂuence
the likelihood and type of societal outcomematerializ-
ing through these pathways (Ide et al 2014).
4. Empirical analysis
In this study we investigate the empirical association
between climate variability, food production, and
political violence across SSA. Country-speciﬁc indica-
tors of temperature and precipitation variability are
constructed from high-resolution gridded climate
statistics from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration and University of Delaware and pre-
pared for analysis via PRIO-GRID (Tollefsen
et al 2012). We use both linear and squared terms to
capture possible nonlinear climate effects on food
production (see sections B and E in the supplementary
information for details).
Annual estimates of national food production
levels are based on the UN’s Food and Agricultural
Organization data bank (FAOSTAT 2012). Unlike
food price statistics, which are affected by, e.g., inter-
national market forces, government-sponsored sub-
sidies, domestic consumption patterns, and
corruption, and are hard to compare across societies,
output statistics in the study region are inherently
related to agricultural performance and closely tied to
local weather patterns4. In models reported below, we
use a country-level aggregate food production index,
expressed in total value of annual food production per
capita in constant 2000 international (Geary–Khamis)
dollars, which best captures the loss of income for
households and the state when harvest fails. We con-
sider yearly production levels, interannual growth in
production, and deviation from the long-term mean.
In sensitivity tests we use indices that tap crops and
cereals production separately.
Data on violent conﬂict are derived from a variety
of sources to capture the diversity of violent outcomes
suggested in ﬁgure 1. Outbreak of civil conﬂict,
deﬁned as the ﬁrst year of ﬁghting between state and
rebel forces causing at least 25 battle-related deaths, is
represented by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂict
Dataset, v.4-2012 (Themnér and Wallensteen 2012).
General social unrest, including public demonstra-
tions and riots, are taken from the Social Conﬂict in
Africa Database, SCAD (Salehyan et al 2012). In sensi-
tivity tests, we run the models on a subset of SCAD
events that are speciﬁcally related to food and sub-
sistence resources (supplementary information,
section C). Third, we include severe inter-communal
violence from the UCDP Non-State Conﬂict dataset,
v.2.3 (Sundberg et al 2012). Finally, we consider the
occurrence of attempted coups (Powell and
Thyne 2011). The SCAD and non-state conﬂict data-
sets are only available for the post-Cold War period;
the remaining two conﬂict datasets cover the entire
post-colonial (1960–) period.
We begin the empirical evaluation by inspecting
aggregate climate variability and food production
trends. The left panel of ﬁgure 2 visualizes the well-
Figure 1. Suggested linkages betweenweather anomaly, food production, and political violence. Solid boxes represent conditions that
aremeasured and tested. Dashed boxes represent unobserved possible causalmechanisms. See supplementary information (section
H) for an overview of illustrative cases in support of these pathways.
4
Local productivity might also be affected by increasing energy and
transportation costs and subsequent spikes in the cost of inorganic
fertilizers.
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known drying across SSA over the past 50 years
(dashed line). After the Sahelian drought of the mid-
1980s, there has been a moderate increase in rainfall,
although with notable interannual and intraregional
variations. The solid line shows contemporaneous
countrymean food production per capita for SSA. The
two phenomena exhibit similar trends (r=0.59), but
the decline in food production per capita is stronger
than that of precipitation, in part because of sub-
stantial population growth in the period. The support-
ing information, section B, provides further evidence
of the powerful effect of rainfall on food production.
Panels 2(b) and (c) illustrate the historical sensitivity of
food production to precipitation deviation across
countries. There is considerable geographic variation
in inﬂuence of rainfall variations on agricultural out-
put; semi-arid countries in the Sahel and East Africa
are especially responsive to rainfall where more rain
means higher yield.
Figure 3 visualizes temporal patterns in the four
forms of political violence considered here. Reﬂecting
the global pattern, conventional state-based civil con-
ﬂicts in SSA (a) increased during the Cold War period
but have since declined in frequency. In contrast, the
frequency of (typically) less severe social unrest events
(b) appear to be on the rise, although some of this
upward trend may be due to improvements in report-
ing over time. Aside from a notable peak in non-state
conﬂict casualties (c) in the early 1990s, this form of
conﬂict displays a weaker time trend. Finally, military
coups (d) were a recurring phenomenon much of the
ColdWar but have since declined in frequency.
The empirical validity of the ﬁrst step in the causal
model, the inﬂuence of weather patterns on crop
yields, is well documented elsewhere so our results on
this link are reported in the supplementary informa-
tion (section B) only. Across all models, we ﬁnd a
strong but nonlinear positive effect of rainfall on food
production whereas yearly mean temperature has a
weaker effect. Next, in order to assess the second step,
conﬂict sensitivity to short-term variations in agri-
cultural output, we estimate a series of regression
models on two alternative geographic samples. Table 1
presents results from eight models covering all coun-
tries in SSA, with the dependent variable oper-
ationalized as civil conﬂict outbreak (Models 1–2); the
logged annual number of social unrest events (Models
3–4); the occurrence of non-state conﬂict (Models
5–6); and the occurrence of one or more attempted
coup(s) d’état in the country year (Models 7–8). As an
initial test, we are primarily interested in the temporal
dynamics of the agriculture-conﬂict relationship
regardless of the origin of food production ﬂuctua-
tions, so the main models are estimated through
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with country
ﬁxed-effects and controls for time trend and serial cor-
relation (see below as well as supplementary informa-
tion, section E, for alternativemodel speciﬁcations).
Across all models, we ﬁnd relatively weak and
insigniﬁcant effects for domestic food production and
we also note that the sign of the coefﬁcients shifts
between outcome types. In this sense, table 1 implicitly
contrasts both claims that political violence is more
prevalent when basic needs are met (Salehyan and
Hendrix 2014) and claims that agricultural income
shocks increase civil conﬂict risk (von Uexkull 2014).
The results are consistent with Koubi et al (2012) and
van Weezel (2015), however, who conclude that rain-
fall—a signiﬁcant determinant of yields in SSA—has
little impact on conﬂict either directly or through eco-
nomic performance.
The covariate that best and most consistently
explains temporal variation in political violence is the
time-lagged conﬂict incidence indicator. Models 1–2
show that a new civil conﬂict is unlikely to break out if
another one is already ongoing in the same country
whereas Models 3–6, which capture the occurrence of
less organized conﬂict, demonstrate that violence
begets violence. Coups d’état (Models 7–8) exhibit a
comparatively weak temporal correlation pattern in
our data and are generally regarded as a highly unpre-
dictable phenomenon (Luttwak 1979).
Next, we estimate the same set of models on a sub-
sample of 14 countries in SSAwhere rainfall has a large
Figure 2.Precipitation and food production across Sub-SaharanAfrica. Panel (a): continentalmean annual food production per
capita (solid line) and precipitation anomaly (dashed line); panels (b) and (c): country-speciﬁc estimated change in food production
per capita with one standard deviation above 1961–90mean rainfall (whiskers represent 95% conﬁdence interval). See tables B3–B6 in
supplementary information for details on the country-speciﬁc association between rainfall and food production.
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and signiﬁcant positive effect on food production
(ﬁgure 2(b); see supplementary information, section B
for details). To better capture the inﬂuence of climate
variability and reduce concerns with endogeneity, we
further replace the standard OLS model with two-
stage instrumental variable regression. The ﬁrst stage
Figure 3.Trends in political violence across Sub-SaharanAfrica. The plots show (a) the number of countries experiencing civil conﬂict
onset and incidence since 1960; (b) frequency of social unrest events since 1990; (c) reported fatalities in non-state conﬂicts since 1989;
and (d) the number of countries with recorded coup attempts since 1960.
Table 1. Food production and political violence in Sub-SaharanAfrica.
Civil conﬂict onset
1962–2009
Social unrest events
1991–2009
Non-state conﬂict
1990–2009 Coup attempt 1962–2009
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Food prod. t−1 0.143 −2.639 −0.468 −0.526
(0.282) (1.578) (0.424) (0.344)
Food prod.Δ t−1 >−0.001 <0.001 >−0.001 >−0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Time 0.001 <0.001 0.011 0.010 −0.003 −0.003 −0.001* −0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Conﬂict t−1 −0.081
** −0.087** 0.328** 0.332** 0.217** 0.219** 0.058 0.059
(0.020) (0.021) (0.047) (0.046) (0.057) (0.056) (0.042) (0.043)
Constant 0.024 0.049** 0.869** 0.612* 0.320** 0.271** 0.168** 0.101**
(0.044) (0.014) (0.290) (0.240) (0.091) (0.086) (0.055) (0.017)
R-squared 0.017 0.017 0.136 0.132 0.052 0.052 0.010 0.009
Observations 1862 1820 795 793 835 833 1862 1820
Countries 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Note: ordinary least squares (OLS) country ﬁxed-effects regression coefﬁcients with clustered standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, *
p<0.05. Odd-numbered models estimate the effect of food production levels whereas even-numbered models estimate the effect of year-
on-year growth (Δ) in food production.
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in this model estimates the joint inﬂuence of annual
rainfall (linear and squared terms) and temperature
(linear) on contemporaneous food production. This
effect then constitutes the exogenous instrument for
food production in the second stage. The results are
reported in table 2. Mirroring the results presented
above, we fail to uncover a robust signal for agri-
cultural performance, although the sign of the coefﬁ-
cient for food production now remains negative in
seven of the eight speciﬁcations.
Food production shocks may have different con-
sequences depending on the socioeconomic context,
so next we consider a series of interactive relation-
ships. Speciﬁcally, we investigate the joint effect of
food production and (i) low level of development, (ii)
extent of discriminatory political system, and (iii) eco-
nomic dependence on agriculture; three conditions
whereby loss of income from agriculture might con-
stitute a particular challenge to society. Tomodel these
interactions, we include time-varying regressors
instead of country-ﬁxed effects where (i) is repre-
sented by infant mortality rate (IMR; World
Bank 2014), (ii) is captured using the Ethnic Power
Relations v.1.1 data (Cederman et al 2010), while (iii)
uses an index of agricultural contribution to GDP
(World Bank 2014). Moreover, to preserve focus on
temporal dynamics, food production is now oper-
ationalized as yearly deviation from the country mean,
1961–2009. We use additive inverse deviation values
to ensure theoretical consistency among the
components in the interaction terms. All models con-
trol for (ln) population size, conﬂict history, and a
common time trend, and models without IMR and
agricultural dependence additionally control for (ln)
GDPper capita. The results are presented in table 3.
Again, we are unsuccessful in establishing a con-
sistent covariation pattern between agricultural per-
formance and political violence. Interpreting the
combined effect of interaction terms with continuous
parameters is inherently difﬁcult but ﬁgure 4 shows
that food production is insigniﬁcantly related to all
conﬂict outcomes across levels of socioeconomic
development for all three interaction terms. The sole
exception is the result in Model 24, where lower food
production in highly discriminatory societies is nega-
tively associated with non-state conﬂict. This result
would seem to contradict the standard scarcity thesis
(Homer-Dixon 1999) although it is consistent with
observations that conﬂict is more prevalent during
surplus years (Witsenburg and Adano 2009, Salehyan
andHendrix 2014).
Mirroring earlier research, ethnopolitical exclu-
sion is strongly related to higher civil conﬂict risk, but
not necessarily to other forms of political violence.
Infant mortality rate and economic dependence on
agriculture appear largely irrelevant. While this may
come as a surprise, recall that most countries in SSA
are characterized by underdevelopment and a large
agricultural sector, implying that the variation in
values on these indicators ismodest.
Table 2. Food production, instrumented byweather, and political violence; climate-sensitive subsample.
Civil conﬂict onset 1962–2009
Social unrest events
1991–2009
Non-state conﬂict
1990–2009 Coup attempt 1962–2009
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Food prod. t−1 −0.695 −2.389 −0.816 0.808
(0.869) (12.915) (5.977) (1.499)
Food prod.Δ t−1 >−0.001 −0.003 −0.003 >−0.001
(0.002) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003)
Time <0.001 <0.001 0.028* 0.027* −0.006 −0.006 −0.001 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Conﬂict t−1 −0.095
* −0.098* 0.395** 0.397** 0.232* 0.231* 0.003 −0.001
(0.041) (0.040) (0.068) (0.067) (0.117) (0.116) (0.043) (0.044)
Constant 0.253 0.154** 0.694 0.399 1.083 0.973** 0.059 0.191**
(0.139) (0.040) (1.693) (0.405) (0.810) (0.128) (0.232) (0.028)
R-squared 0.041 0.047 0.672 0.671 0.628 0.624 0.034 0.049
Observations 666 652 266 266 280 280 666 652
Countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Precip. ﬁrst stage .163** 83.9** .080** 85.9** .096** 90.8** .163** 83.8**
Precip. sq.ﬁrst stage −.058** −29.6** −.034** −33.9** −.039** −35.2** −.058** −29.6**
Temp.ﬁrst stage .003 −2.97 −.004 −5.48 −.001 −3.67 .003 −2.98
Endogeneity test .601/.45 .046/.83 .018/.90 .115/.74 .070/.80 .337/.57 1.41/.26 .005/.94
P(Bassman overid.) .60 .52 .84 .85 .03 .04 .51 .50
P(Sargan overid.) .59 .51 .83 .84 .02 .03 .50 .50
Note: two-stage least squares coefﬁcients with standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Odd-numbered
models estimate the effect of food production levels whereas even-numbered models estimate the effect of year-on-year growth (Δ) in food
production. Contemporaneous effects and instrumented results for the full Sub-Saharan Africa sample are documented in supplementary
information, section E.
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Table 3. Interactionmodels.
Civil conﬂict onset 1962–2009 Social unrest events 1991–2009 Non-state conﬂict 1990–2009 Coup attempt 1962–2009
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Food prod. dev. t−1 −0.029 −0.002 −0.013 0.002 0.001 0.004 −0.020 0.004 −0.031 −0.015 0.012 −0.009
(0.023) (0.008) (0.019) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.022) (0.009) (0.037) (0.019) (0.008) (0.018)
IMR t−1 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004)
Food t−1×IMR t−1 <0.001 >−0.001 <0.001 <0.001
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Discrimination t−1 1.531
** 1.303* 1.499** −0.034 0.296 0.060 0.421 1.332 0.846 −0.178 −0.335 −0.328
(0.527) (0.551) (0.503) (0.262) (0.371) (0.267) (0.892) (0.911) (0.771) (0.478) (0.496) (0.491)
Foodt
−1×Discrimination
t−1
−0.004 −0.033 −0.101* <0.001
(0.025) (0.027) (0.044) (0.021)
Agriculture dependence
t−1
0.011 <0.001 0.013 0.019**
(0.009) (0.003) (0.014) (0.007)
Food t−1×Agric. dep.
t−1
<0.001 >−0.001 0.001 0.001
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) (<0.001)
GDPp.c. (ln) t−1 −0.220 −0.008 −0.273 −0.368
*
(0.182) (0.053) (0.184) (0.160)
Population (ln) 0.279* 0.287** 0.207 0.183** 0.179** 0.190** 0.867** 0.826** 1.017** −0.023 −0.058 −0.106
(0.115) (0.110) (0.126) (0.037) (0.041) (0.039) (0.153) (0.172) (0.178) (0.103) (0.113) (0.128)
Time 0.028 0.011 0.021 −0.002 −0.003 −0.005 −0.063** −0.070** −0.066* −0.023 −0.026* −0.024
(0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.023) (0.019) (0.027) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
Conﬂict t−1 −0.615 −0.646
* −0.830* 0.614** 0.607** 0.594** 2.631** 2.631** 2.246** 1.052** 0.956** 0.751*
(0.370) (0.308) (0.382) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.404) (0.408) (0.390) (0.366) (0.349) (0.376)
Constant −7.258** −4.480** −5.948** −1.045** −0.843 −0.926** −8.486** −5.625* −9.914** −2.266* 0.982 −1.753
(1.202) (1.233) (1.121) (0.348) (0.561) (0.333) (1.530) (2.667) (2.292) (0.972) (1.651) (0.961)
Observations 1766 1862 1609 795 795 757 835 835 795 1766 1862 1609
Model ﬁt −297.75 −321.42 −274.96 0.555 0.557 0.536 −230.99 −230.04 −207.83 −420.52 −442.98 −388.25
Note: OLS (Models 20–22) and logit (all othermodels) coefﬁcients with clustered standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.Modelﬁt denotes log likelihood (logitmodels) orR-squared (OLSmodels).
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Large parameter uncertainties and p-values above
the conventional signiﬁcance threshold (5%)may dis-
guise substantively important effects (Ward et al
2010). Accordingly, as a ﬁnal assessment, we conduct a
set of out-of-sample simulations and compare predic-
tions for models with and without food production.
The models are estimated on a subset of the full sam-
ple, in this case all years before 2000, and the estimated
effects are then used to predict conﬂict outcomes out
of sample, i.e., the 2000–09 period. Figure 5 shows the
predicted values from four pairs of models that are
speciﬁed similarly toModels 17, 20, 23, and 26, except
for the shorter time period and the fact that onemodel
in each pair drops the food production deviation vari-
able. For civil conﬂict and social unrest, the models
generate very similar predictions, signaling that agri-
cultural performance adds little to the models’ pre-
dictive power. There is more spread in the predictions
for the remaining two outcome categories. Puzzlingly,
themodel without food production performs better in
both cases—i.e., the Receiver Operating Character-
istics curves have higher ‘Area Under the Curve’
scores. We hesitate to put too much emphasis on the
ROC tests, given the rareness of the outcomes (notably
Models 17 and 26) and the relatively small training
samples (Models 20 and 23), but nonetheless the pat-
terns observed in the out-of-sample simulations sub-
stantiate the regression results reported above;
ﬂuctuations in agricultural output explain little of the
observed variation in political violence in post-colo-
nial Sub-SaharanAfrica.
5. Concluding remarks
Emerging evidence suggests that food price shocks are
associated with an increase in social unrest
(Smith 2014, Bellemare 2015, Hendrix and Hag-
gard 2015,Weinberg andBakker 2015). Yet, the robust
‘non-ﬁnding’ presented here implies that so-called
‘food riots’ play out largely isolated from climate-
sensitive production dynamics in the affected coun-
tries. Likewise, claims that adverse weather and harvest
failure drive contemporary violence in Africa (e.g.,
Hsiang et al 2013, IFPRI 2015) are not supported by
our analysis. Instead, social protest and rebellion
during times of food price spikes may be better
understood as reactions to poor and unjust govern-
ment policies, corruption, repression, and market
failure (e.g., Bush 2010, Buhaug andUrdal 2013, Sneyd
et al 2013, Chenoweth andUlfelder 2015).
While this study has gone further than earlier
research in seeking to uncover an indirect and condi-
tional effect of climate variability on collective political
violence via food production shocks, a few caveats are
in order. First, lack of signiﬁcant results should not be
interpreted as a de facto dismissal of any possible link
Figure 4.Marginal effect of food production on political violence by socioeconomic context. The plots showpredicted change in the
risk of four types of political violence (rows) for each unit (%) increase in food production as a function of alternative socioeconomic
and political conditions (columns). Shaded areas represent 95% conﬁdence intervals around the estimated interaction effects.
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between food insecurity and social unrest. Impor-
tantly, we do not account for how agricultural deﬁcit
among major global food exporters as well as interna-
tional food price volatilities translate into domestic
food insecurity in vulnerable societies, and to what
extent political leaders are able and willing to imple-
ment effective countermeasures.
Second, our country-averaged study also is unable
to capture highly localized dynamics and events in the
same manner as geographically disaggregated studies
that explore the more direct association between cli-
mate variability and civil conﬂict (e.g., Theisen
et al 2011, 2012). Unfortunately, lack of crop yield sta-
tistics below the scale of countries hinders such an
analytical approach here, although we ﬁnd it reason-
able to assume that socioeconomic shocks capable of
triggering large-scale conﬂict are likely to be of a
magnitude sufﬁciently severe to be detectable even in
the aggregated data. Besides, it is not given that cli-
matic or agricultural shocks and social responses
necessarily play out within the same subnational units
of observation (provinces or grid cells), which compli-
cates the causal identiﬁcation strategy.
Moreover, one should not ignore the reverse rela-
tionship between food insecurity and conﬂict. Armed
conﬂict is development in reverse, and civil war is per-
haps the most important driver of malnourishment
and hunger in Africa today (FAO, IFAD and
WFP 2015). Likewise, chronic violence and political
instability undermine human security, make popula-
tions more vulnerable to harsh environmental condi-
tions (Busby et al 2013, Ide et al 2014), and sometimes
engendermassive refugee ﬂows5.
Future climate change, coupled with demographic
and socioeconomic development, is projected to wor-
sen environmental and ecological conditions and
hamper agricultural productivity improvements
across large parts of the African continent. Inferring
Figure 5.Out-of-sample predictions of political violence. The plots show (a) predicted risk of civil conﬂict onset, (b)predicted number
of (log) social unrest events, (c) predicted risk of non-state conﬂict, and (d) predicted risk of coup attempt formodels with andwithout
food production. All predictions refer to the period 2000–09. Each dot represents a country; symbols in panels (a), (c), and (d) denote
true outcomes in the period.
5
A powerful reverse relationship also raises concerns about
endogeneity bias in the statistical analysis. This is handled by
specifying time lags on time-varying regressors and using exogenous
instruments for food production in some models (table 2 as well as
section E in the supplementary information).
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from recent historical patterns, there is little reason to
fear that this development by itself should result in
higher rates of social disturbances. Instead, African
stability and peace are likely to be inﬂuenced by the
trajectories of social, political, and economic contexts
within which food security threats emerge and are
dealt with. As the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report
concludes, ‘it is likely that socioeconomic and techno-
logical trends, including changes in institutions and
policies, will remain a relatively stronger driver of food
security over the next few decades than climate
change’ (Porter et al 2014, p 513). Although we should
not underestimate conceivably adverse social effects of
climate change-induced droughts and crop failures
outside of violent conﬂict, a number of instruments
exist in the policy maker’s toolbox to minimize such
risks, including trade, subsidies, substitution, diversi-
ﬁcation, insurance schemes, and strategic storage
policies, and—in the longer run—technological
development, innovation (including genetic engineer-
ing), and improved early warning systems (e.g., God-
fray et al 2010,UNEP 2015,Wiebe et al 2015).
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